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Implementing cryptography and security into integrated circuits is somehow 
similar to applications in other fields. We have to worry about comparable 
optimization goals: area, power, energy, throughput and/or latency. Moore’s law 
helps to attain these goals. However, it also gives the attackers more 
computational power to break cryptographic algorithms. On top of this, quantum 
computers may become soon a reality, so that novel, very computationally 
demanding “post-quantum” cryptographic algorithms need implementation. 
Finally, there is a third dimension to the problem: implementations have to be 
resistant against physical attacks and countermeasures increase the cost. This 
paper demonstrates with actual data how these conflicting challenges are being 
addressed. 
More Moore: The strength of an algorithm is expressed by the computational 
complexity of known cryptanalytic tools to ‘break’ the algorithm on classical 
computers. The computational complexity for secret key algorithms such as 
DES or AES is of the form 2b with b the key length: i.e. the effort of trying all 
possible keys. b equal to at least 128 is recommended for secret key 
algorithms. Public key algorithms are based on mathematical problems which 
require much larger key lengths: a key length of at least 3284 bits is 
recommended for RSA, while 256 bit keys are the norm for elliptic curve-based 
cryptosystems (ECC). Fig 1(top) shows the minimum key lengths of various 
algorithms for cryptographic security for the next 40 years and beyond, the 
consequence of Moore’s law. 
Symmetric key algorithms, such as AES, use arithmetic that runs inefficiently on 
standard instruction sets or C compilers. Energy efficiency, measured as 
Gbits/Joule, is shown on Fig 1 (bottom) for the two most popular modes of 
operation: the Counter Mode (CTR), which can be pipelined, and the Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) encryption mode, which puts the AES engine in a 
feedback mode, which cannot be pipelined. It illustrates how dedicated ASICs 
or instructions are more energy efficient than generic FPGA or SW 
implementations [1][2][3]. It also shows the improvement over technology 
nodes. E.g. AES instructions on the Haswell Intel platform require 0.63 and 
4.44 cycles/byte for CTR and CBC-encryption respectively [1], which converted 
to Gbits/Joule is many orders of magnitude more energy efficient than generic 
assembly or C-compiled code.  
Physical security: As the computational complexity of the algorithms improved 
and mathematical attacks became practically infeasible, the focus of attackers 
moved towards the physical implementation. Physical attacks are broadly split 
into two main classes. Passive side-channel attacks observe data-dependent 
variations in timing, power consumption and/or electromagnetic radiation of 
cryptographic algorithms during calculations, from which the key or other 
sensitive data is revealed. Active attacks intentionally introduce faults by 
manipulating clock or power supply or introduce glitches. More advanced 
attackers shoot with lasers or perform EM manipulations. Unfortunately, many 
countermeasures are expensive and conflict. Countermeasures against side-
channel attacks might make fault-attacks easier. At this moment, practical 
schemes provide resistance but not provable resistance, while mathematically 
provable secure systems (against a well defined attacker model) remain 
unrealistic in practice. Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) was the first 
practical circuit level countermeasure demonstrated on the size of a complete 
AES co-processor to resist Differential Power and Electromagnetic Attacks [3]. 
The idea is to make the power consumption profile independent of the actual 
data being processed by switching exactly once the same amount of energy 
every clock cycle. A WDDL exor/nexor gate is shown on Fig 2. For circuit level 
countermeasures, the quality of the resistance depends on the quality of the 
circuit design including balanced place and route. Mathematical 
countermeasures such as threshold implementations aim at being independent 
of the actual circuit implementation [4]. They split the data in different ‘shares’ 
and make sure that at no point in time power consumption information is 
available from all shares, see Fig 2. However in practice, heavy pipelining is 
required to keep the shares apart [4] and temporal or spatial separation is 
difficult to enforce.  It also requires access to a large amount of randomness.   
Post-quantum security: The security of current mainstream public key 
algorithms RSA and DSA, ECC, and ECDSA (EC Digital Signature Algorithm) is 
based on the computational effort to break mathematically ‘hard’ problems such 
as factorization or the discrete log. Unfortunately, it was shown by Shor that 
these problems become ‘easy’ to solve in case quantum computers become a 
reality.  Hence, the cryptographic community is working on algorithms, which 
remain secure in the quantum computer era.  So far, most of them have a much 
higher computational complexity. One novel approach is the lattice based Ring 
Learning with Errors (RLWE) crypto system [5]. In this scheme, messages are 
encoded and represented by finite field polynomials, typically with 256 or 512 
coefficients, each coefficient of size 13 to 14 bits (in NTT format). The 
encryption process consists of two major steps: first creating error polynomials, 
which involves generating random numbers and using them in a discrete 
Gaussian sampler. Secondly, they are multiplied and added with the message 
polynomial. Straightforward schoolbook multiplication of two polynomials, 
requires O(n2) multiplications. For large n, in this case 256 or 512, conversion to 
the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) domain reduces this to O(nlogn) 
number of multiplications. Three different implementations of the RLWE 
processor are made in ASIC (synthesized results), FPGA and SW running on 
an ARMCortex-M4F, (Fig. 3). Fig. 4 shows the architecture of a compact RLWE 
co-processor, with the best area-time performance published so far [5].  With 
progress on the theoretical side, more efficient fully-homomorphic schemes 
based on the RLWE problem are appearing. So far, for 80 bit security (so less 
than AES), it requires a polynomial of degree n= 32768 and field size 1225 bits, 
which determines the number of multiplications and the size of the multiplier. 
Thus the challenge for the circuit designer is to realize these huge multipliers 
and to provide sufficient entropy for the random number generation.   
PUFs: In the future, cryptography and hardware will be even more entangled, 
making active use of features provided by silicon technology. Cryptography by 
itself does not provide security: it needs securely stored secret keys, high 
quality random numbers, nonces (non repeating numbers), unforgeable unique 
IDs and more. It relies for that on circuits and silicon technologies which are 
poorly characterized for security purposes.  PUFs, Physically Uncloneable 
Functions, are a first enabling technology for this, producing uncloneable and 
inherent instance-specific measurements of integrated circuits, comparable to 
human fingerprints. PUF behavior is the result of processing variations and 
circuit design decisions. E.g. the start-up value of a 6-TOR SRAM cell is a 
source of PUF material, if it is nicely differentially designed and laid out. We 
derived experimentally, using a black-box approach without knowing the 
internal organization of the SRAM, the amount of PUF material available in the 
SRAM of commodity micro-controllers. Robustness (= same value at each start-
up) and uniqueness (= difference between any two samples of same device) 
are measured with Hamming weight, within-class-Hamming-distance, and 
between-class-Hamming-distance, which should reach 50%, 0%, and 50% 
respectively. Results are shown in Figs 5 and 6 for the STMicroelectronics 
STM32F100R8 and the Microchip PIC16F1825 [6]. The STM32F100R8 has 
very good PUF behavior while the PIC16F1825 behaves poorly. PUF behavior 
and noise for random number generations are two ends of the same scale. For 
PUFs we prefer a large variability (i.e. random process variation but no bias), 
stable over multiple measurements with small effects of environmental noise, 
while if we want to extract min-entropy for a RNG we expect circuits that are 
sensitive to environmental noise. We use the unstable startup bits of the 
SRAMs as a seed for a random number generator [6].  
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Figure 24.1.1: Recommended key length; AES on various platforms 
and technologies 
 
Figure 24.1.2: Wave Dynamic Differential Logic and Threshold 
countermeasures 
 
Figure 24.1.3: Ring LWE post-quantum crypto on ASIC, FPGA and ARM 
Cortex-M4F SW 
 
Figure 24.1.4: Compact Ring LWE architecture 
 
Figure 24.1.5: PUF behavior of SRAMs on commodity micro-controllers 
 
Figure 24.1.6: Visual representation of SRAM PUF responses ('0' is 
white, '1' is black) 
 
